In this paper, I show that "investable premia" are greatest for transparent, well-governed firms. I find that single-class share investable firms and better-governed firms reap the largest valuation gains from becoming investable. Dual-class share firms do gain from becoming investable, but their gains are much lower than that of single-class share firms. These findings suggest that the failure on the part of firms to remedy agency conflicts prior to becoming investable only serves to greatly reduce, or even nullify their "investable premia".
Introduction
Over the course of the last three decades, emerging markets as currently designated, have, using stock market liberalizations opened up their domestic firms to foreign ownership. For example, using the official liberalization dates provided by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) , Portugal (1986) , Greece (1987) , Thailand (1987) , followed by Malaysia (1988) , and Morocco (1989) were amongst the first emerging markets to liberalize their stock markets. Since then, others have followed, including Argentina (1989) , Brazil (1991) , and India (1992) . More recently, countries such as Tunisia (1995) and South Africa (1996) have followed suit. Subsequently, a large literature has shown that this type of financial liberalization reform has proved beneficial. At the firm-level and consistent with international asset pricing models, stock market liberalizations tend to reduce the cost of equity capital as a result of greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors. In turn, this has resulted in reduced financing constraints (Kim and Signal, 2000) ), increased investment (Henry, 2000; Mitton, 2006 using firm-level data), improved operating performance (Mitton, 2006) , and enhanced stock prices (Chari and Henry, 2004 ). Perhaps then not surprisingly, Mitton and O'Connor (2011) show that these realized gains impact positively on the value of these firms. Using Tobin's q to proxy for firm value, they uncover an "investable premium" in the region of 9% for investable firms. At the country (aggregate) level, such reforms have resulted in greater investment and ultimately economic growth (Bekaert et al., 2001 (Bekaert et al., , 2005 ; Gupta and Yuan, 2009 ). However, with some exceptions (Mitton, 2006; Mitton and O'Connor, 2011) , much of this analysis has been performed with the average firm in mind, which potentially ignores the heterogeneous effects that financial liberalization has across firms, since firms with the most to gain from becoming investable e.g., firms with sizable financing constraints, are likely to benefit the most. Consistent with this view, Mitton and O'Connor (2011) show that the greatest valuations gains from stock market liberalizations accrue to financially constrained firms (as measured using investment-cashflow sensitivities (Fazzari et al., 1988) ). Furthermore, the ability of firms to attract outside/foreign investment is in large part contingent on their ability to convince outsider investors that expropriation risk is low. Since investors tend to invest in transparent, well-governed firms (Leuz et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2005) , this then suggests that the greatest gains to financial liberalization should accrue to transparent, well-governed firms, where the consumption of private benefits is low. In contrast, poorly governed firms are likely to gain very little or potentially nothing at all from financial liberalization. Hence, the "investable premium" is likely to be much higher for transparent, well-governed firms. In this paper, I test this proposition.
Specifically, I examine, whether the "investable premium" documented by Mitton and O'Connor (2011) is greatest for these transparent, well-governed firms.
To do so, I form a panel of 1,510 firms: 251 investable and 1,259 non-investable firms, and use Tobin's q to proxy for firm value. While on average, corporate governance practices tend to be less transparent in emerging markets (relative to firms in developed countries), sizable variation in corporate governance practices exists both across and within emerging market countries (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005) . To capture this variation in governance practices across firms and countries, I use three different measures commonly employed in other studies. The first classifies firms as either dualor single-class share firms. Typically, single-class share firms are more transparent and better-governed than dual-class share firms (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Masulis et al., 2009 ). In the case of the latter, insiders posses sizable control rights without commensurate cashflow rights, by holding shares with greater voting rights. In this instance, controlling insiders create a 'wedge' between their voting and cashflow rights, creating a situation whereby expropriation is costly for minority outsiders, and ultimately beneficial for the controlling insiders. A large literature suggests that outsiders, most notably institutional investors are reluctant to invest in such firms (Leuz et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008) . 1 Thus, a priori, I would expect that single-class share investable firms would reap large valuation gains from becoming investable, both on an absolute basis, and relative to dual-class firms. Whether dual-class share firms reap any valuation gains is an open empirical question. Recent work suggests that dual-class firms experience permanent valuation gains from another aspect of internationalizations, namely international cross-listings (King and Segal, 2009 ). However, they do so through legal bonding arising from cross-listing in the U.S. 2 1 Recent work has focused on examining the governance preferences of institutional investors (McCahery et al., 2009; Bushee et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008) . These papers find that institutional investors have both a preference for well-governed firms, and a desire to improve this governance through what is commonly referred to as "shareholder activism". For a review of the governance role played by institutional investors, see Gillan and Starks (2003) . Recent work questions the governance role played by institutional investors in the current financial crisis. Banks with high institutional ownership performed worse than banks with less institutional ownership, because institutional investors encouraged greater risk-taking prior to the crisis (Erkens et al., 2010) .
While equity market liberalizations are associated with improvements in firms' information environment 2 King and Segal (2009) show that bonding alone is sufficient for dual-class Canadian firms to reap a permanent "cross-listing premium". (Bae et al., 2006) ; they are not accompanied with any formal bonding mechanism. 3 Thus, absent bonding, dual-class investable firms are likely to reap little valuation gains, since risk sharing through an expansion of their shareholder base is likely to be minimal. 4 This is exactly what I find. I begin by reconfirming the findings of Mitton and O'Connor (2011) .
For the average firm, investability increases firm value in the region of 10.5%. In turn, I show that this "investable premium" is greatest for single-class share firms. Dual-class share firms do not experience an "investable premium", relative to other single-and dual-class non-investable firms, but do so relative to their counterpart non-investable dual-class firms. Next, using the agency cost measures; I find that bettergoverned firms experience the largest "investable premia". All in all, these findings are consistent with a large literature, which shows that investors are less likely to invest in poorly governed firms (Leuz et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2005) , and appear to confirm Stulz's (2005) assertion that the gains from financial globalization (stock market liberalizations in this instance) are limited by what he refers to as the agency problem of "corporate insider discretion". Here the agency cost arises since insiders run the firm in their own best interests, and not in the interests of outside minority shareholders. Consequently outsiders/institutional investors are less likely to invest in these firms. The result is that poorly-governed firms and dual-class share firms in particular gain little, or at least in the case of the latter, much less than their single-class share counterparts. As a result, these findings suggest that firms should improve their governance prior to becoming investable in order maximize the subsequent valuation gains. Since stock market liberalizations tend to occur when financial markets are already well-developed (Kim and Kenny, 2007) , and the costs of improving corporate governance tend to be much lower as a result (Doidge et al., Second, I use two measures, which gauge the extent of agency costs in a firm, namely the ratio of sales-to-assets, and operating expenses-to-sales. Since agency costs are decreasing (increasing) in the former (latter), a priori, I would expect that the greatest valuation gains accrue to firms with a high sales-to-assets ratio, and a low operating expenses-to-sales ratio. 3 Lang et al. (2003) relate the valuation gains from cross-listing in the U.S. to improvements in firms' information environment (i.e. increased analyst following and improved forecast accuracy). Thus, even absent bonding, (voluntary) improvements in a firm's information environment may be sufficient to generate an "investable premium". 4 Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that these firms may be able to attract foreign investors by voluntarily providing better disclosures and improving their corporate governance. Along these lines, Hope et al. (2010) show how cross-listing firms not mandated to provide greater disclosures (i.e. Level 1/Rule 144a firms) actually provide more frequent and higher quality disclosures than Level 2/3 firms who are mandated to do so. 2007), then the net effect (i.e. the benefits of becoming investable less the costs of corporate governance improvements prior to becoming investable) of becoming investable is still likely to be positive. 5 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I describe the data used in the study. In Section 3 I report results on the relation between investability, corporate governance and firm value. Section 4 concludes. To be included in the final sample, firms must have financial data available in the Worldscope database and satisfy a number of minimum-data requirements. First, I require that firms that become investable in the sample period have financial data available at least one year before and one year after the year in which they are first deemed investable. 6 Morgan, the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. I take great care in order to identify a firm's initial listing. To do so, I consult the historical records from the Bank of New York (since the currently available on-line records refer to a firm's current -not previous/initial -cross-listing). I cross-reference this data with the cross-listing database provided by Citibank. They flag firms that have changed their cross-listing status by including a "successor depositary receipt" data type for all firms. South Africa (18) and Mexico (14) provide the greatest number of cross-listing firms. Tobin's q, sales growth, firm size, leverage and profitability are winsorized at the 1 and 99% tails of the distribution to remove the confounding effects of outliers. Finally, I exclude financial firms since these firms are more likely to be valued differently from non-financial firms.
Data
To measure the strength of corporate governance, I use three different measures. The first is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is a dual-class share firm. A large literature has documented that since cash-flow and voting rights are separated under such a mechanism in these firms (in contrast to a one-share-one-vote system), the consumption of private benefits tends to be greater in firms with dual-class shares compared to firms with single-class share structures (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1988, and more recently, Masulis et al., 2009). 8 8 Durnev and Kim (2005 show using CLSA and S&P corporate governance data that in firms where control rights exceed cashflow rights (e.g. dual-class share firms), corporate governance standards tend to be lower in these firms, relative to firms where no such differences (or much smaller differences) exist between control and cashflow rights (e.g. single-class share firms).
As a result, dualclass share firms tend to trade at a discount relative to single-class share companies (Lins, 2003 McKnight and Weir (2009) use variants of these agency cost ratios in their respective studies. 9 Table 1 displays the number of single and dual-class investable firms, and also the median value of the two agency cost ratios (calculated over the entire sample period) for our sample of investable firms, for each country. These summary measures suggest that corporations are better-governed in Colombia, South Africa, and Turkey (using sales-to-assets). In contrast, agency conflicts tend to be severe in China.
Finally, 55 or 21.91% of the entire sample of investable firms are deemed dual-class share firms. Greece One potential drawback of using these agency cost measures in this context is that some studies also use Tobin's q to measure agency costs. Here, agency costs are expected to decrease in Tobin's q.
Consequently, the correlations amongst the agency cost proxies i.e., amongst Tobin's q and the other variables may be driving my results. While I cannot definitively rule out this possibility, the correlations amongst the variables are small, and suggest that this may not be a major issue. For example, the correlation coefficient between Tobin's q and (annual) sales to total assets is just 0.076 and -0.045 for Tobin's q and operating expenses to annual sales. In addition, and in order to try and overcome this potential problem, I estimate in Table 6 , separate regressions for firms with high and low pre-investable agency costs. If firms with low pre-investable agency costs (and thus presumably better governance) reap the largest gains from becoming investable, this then suggests that better governed firms reap the largest gains from becoming investable, and that this result is not 'mechanically' driven by the correlation amongst the variables in the post-investable period.
and Mexico provide the greatest number with 11 each. India, Pakistan, and Turkey contribute no dualclass share investable firm to the final sample.
Investability, Corporate Governance and Firm Value
This section presents the main results on the relationship between investability, corporate governance and firm value. I begin by first examining the relationship between investability and firm value as per Mitton and O'Connor (2011) . I then estimate the joint-effect of investability and corporate governance on firm value.
Regression Estimates
In line with Mitton and O'Connor (2011), I first try to establish a causal link between investability and firm value. The results are outlined in Table 2 . In subsequent analysis, I attempt to uncover whether it is better-governed firms that enjoy the largest valuation gains from becoming investable.
To do the former, I estimate a series of firm-fixed effects regressions of the following form: Table 2 , with tstatistics calculated using standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering reported in square brackets underneath (Petersen, 2009 ). 10 In Column 1 of Table 2 , I regress Tobin's q on the investable dummies alone (time and fixed effects are included). In subsequent columns, I sequentially add firm and industry-level control variables.
Column 6 presents the coefficient estimates with all firm and industry-level control variables included. In the remaining columns of Table 2 , I control for indirect investability. In column 7, I add cross-listing dummy variables to column 6. In column 8, country fund data is added to the specification in column 6.
The coefficient estimates on the investable dummies are positive and statistically significant in all regressions. The coefficient estimates range from 0.101 to 0.139. Since the median investable firm has a Tobin's q of 1.20, this suggests that the act of becoming fully investable causes an average change in value of 10.5% (i.e., (0.126/1.20)*100) for the median firm. Also, the control variables tend to be of the correct sign and are statistically significant. Firm value increases with leverage, profitability, firm and industry growth, while smaller firms tend to be worth more. 11 Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6 examine how the valuation gains, documented in Table 2 , differ by level of corporate governance. In Table 3 Amongst others, the benefit of using all four is that they allow me to include the dual-class (timeinvariant) indicator. However, there are potential shortcomings in using each approach. For example, the pooled ordinary least squares estimates are likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias (unobserved heterogeneity) and be inconsistent. It is hard to envisage instances in which firm value is not affected by unobserved heterogeneity/attributes such as entrepreneurial skills/managerial ability, and access to valuable networks. The random effects approach overcomes this shortcoming to a point. The random effects approach accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity, but assumes that it is uncorrelated with other right-hand side (observable) variables. However, the results from a standard Hausman test suggest that this is not the case. Given the shortcomings of these approaches, I estimate a series of separate firm fixedeffects regressions for single-and dual-class share investable firms (and all non-investable firms) in Table   4 , and for single-and dual-class share investable firms relative to other single-and dual-class noninvestable firms in Table 5 . 
Second, an ordinary least squares regression of the fixed effects on the time-invariant variables is performed: 
In summary, The coefficient estimates in Table 3 suggest that this is not the case. In line with the analysis presented in Table 2 Since these findings run contrary to my prior expectations, and given the potential concerns with the estimators employed in Table 3 , I explore this issue further in In Table 4 for single-class share firms.
If the results from Table 3 hold, I would then expect to find no significant difference in the coefficient estimates on the investable dummy for both single-and dual-class firms in the firm fixed-effects regressions. The coefficient estimates presented in Table 4 suggest otherwise.
In contrast to both the findings presented for single-class share firms and the results presented in Table 3 , there is no "investable premium" for dual-class share firms. The coefficient estimates are positive on the investable and degree-open factors, but always statistically indifferent to zero. These results suggest that the "investable premium" is large and statistically significant for single-class share firms; for dual-class share firms, there is no premium. These findings are in line with my prior expectations, and are consistent with the view that better-governed firms should reap the largest gains from becoming investable. In this paper, I find that single-class share firms, typically better-governed than dual-class share firms do. Using the liberalization of the Korean equity market, Bae and Goyal (2010) find likewise. 15 The sample size now drops to 9,523 firm-year observations when I exclude dual-class share investable firms and 8,100 when I exclude single-class share investable firms.
Finally, the coefficient estimates on the control variables from Tables 3 and 4 are correctly signed and invariably statistically significant. In all specifications, dual-class share firms tend to be worth less than single-class share firms. This is in line with a large literature, which suggests that investors apply a larger discount rate to these firms (Lins, 2003 Finally, firm value tends to increase in firm and industry growth, leverage and profitability. Large firms tend to be valued less highly than smaller firms. Table 4 suggests that only single-class share investable firms enjoy an "investable premium".
Nonetheless, these findings do not rule out the possibility that dual-class share firms enjoy an "investable premium" when compared to other non-investable dual-class share firms. Table 4 suggests that when compared to single-and dual-class non-investable firms, dual-class share investable firms do not experience an "investable premium". They may well do so relative to just non-investable dual-class firms.
In Table 5 In all regressions, the control variables are included, but only reported using the investable dummy regressions for brevity sake. The coefficient estimates suggest that it is only better-governed firms that experience valuation gains from becoming investable. Using both agency cost measures, the coefficient estimates for the better-governed firms (Above-median sales-to-assets and below-median operating expenses-to-sales) are both positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient estimates on the investable dummy for pre-investable poorly governed firms are smaller, and statistically insignificant. Specifically, using the investable dummies, the coefficient estimates on the investable dummy for better-governed investable firms (i.e., Above-median sales-to-assets and below-median operating expenses-to-sales) are 0.196 and 0.186, respectively. In contrast, for poorly governed firms (i.e., Belowmedian sales-to-assets and above-median operating expenses-to-sales) the coefficient estimates are much smaller (0.086 and 0.037, respectively) and statistically indifferent to zero. The same holds when I use the degree-open factors. In summary, these results, together with the findings presented in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the "investable premia" documented by Mitton and O'Connor (2011) is much higher for single-class share firms, and better-governed firms in general. 18 For comparison sake, I also present the coefficient estimate for the entire sample of firms.
Concluding Remarks
Over the course of the last two decades, a sizable literature has demonstrated how financial liberalization reforms have proved beneficial for firms. One such reform, namely stock market liberalizations have served to reduce the cost of equity capital for firms, reduced their financing constraints, which in turn has fostered greater investment, and ultimately has increased their value.
However, subsequent work has suggested that the benefits are not as large as expected, and that agency conflicts at both the country and firm level may explain these findings. In this paper I examine whether agency conflicts at the level of the firm impacts on the size of the "investable premia" documented by Using three measures to proxy for the extent of agency conflicts, I show that the "investable premia" documented by Mitton and O'Connor (2011) is greatest for transparent, well-governed and single-class share firms. In contrast, for poorly governed firms the benefits are much lower. Stock market liberalizations do increase the value of dual-class share firms, at least relative to their peers, but their "investable premia" are much lower than that of single-class share firms. The findings are in line with recent evidence, which demonstrates that outside investors, most notably institutional investors prefer to invest in single-class share, and well-governed firms (Li et al., 2008) . For these firms, the resulting investment results in large "investable premia". Furthermore these findings suggest that more attention should be paid by firms to improving their corporate governance prior to investability, so that firms can extract the largest gains possible from stock market liberalizations. Table 2 Regression estimates of the effect of investability on firm value Investable Dummies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) . Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as ernings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to total assets. ADR variables are dummy variables that are set equal to one in years in which the firm has an ADR of the specified type. Country fund is a dummy variable indicating the existence of a closed-end country fund in the firm's country. Also estimated but not reported are a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Dual-Class is 1 if the firm is a dual-class firm, 0 otherwise. Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to total assets. Also estimated but not reported are a constant, a full set of year dummies, and a full set of country dummies (In specifications 1-6). Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable., zero otherwise. The degree open factor ranges from zero (not open to foreign investors) to one (fully open to foreign investors). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as ernings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to total assets. ADR variables are dummy variables that are set equal to one in years in which the firm has an ADR of the specified type. Country fund is a dummy variable indicating the existence of a closed-end country fund in the firm's country. Also estimated but not reported is a constant and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 6 Regression estimates of the effect of investability and agency costs on firm value Investable Dummies Sales-to-Assets (Agency Cost 1)
Operating Expenses-to-Sales (Agency Cost 2) All Above Median AC 1 estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions for seperate regressions for firms that were and were not above the sample median agency costs, with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for firm-level clustering, in parentheses. The dependent variable is Tobin's q. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable., zero otherwise. Agency Costs is either sales to assets (Agency Cost 1) or operating expenses to sales (Agency Cost 2). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global Industry Q is calculated as the average Q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to total assets. Also estimated but not reported are a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Figure 1 : This figure displays the mean and median value of investable firms from five years prior to becoming investable to ten years after. The top row displays the mean and median absolute and relative value of investable firms. Absolute value is measured using Tobin's q. Tobin's q is calculated as the book value of debt plus market capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its book value counterpart, and the replacement cost of assets as the book value of assets. Book value of debt is calculated as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity. Relative value is measured using median-adjusted Relative q. Median-adjusted relative Tobin's q is calculated as the value of each investable firm divided by the median value of all non-investable firms in each firm's home country (in each year). The bottom row displays the absolute and relative value of single-and dual-class share investable firms.
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